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Evaluating Risk Management Strategies for Non-Irrigated Small Grain Producers 
 
The 2002 Food Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) may raise some questions 
about whether or not US agricultural policy has shifted toward re-emphasizing traditional 
support programs for agriculture. However, crop insurance programs continue to receive 
significant emphasis for risk management.  The recent budget request from USDA’s Risk 
Management Agency indicates that the use of crop insurance continues to expand, new products 
are being developed (including livestock-oriented insurance), and RMA’s emphasis on risk 
management education continues to move forward (Davidson).  Thus, the role of government-
assisted risk management programs (led by insurance-based products) will likely continue to be a 
major component of US agriculture. 
The Pacific Northwest (PNW) region, represented by the states of Washington, Oregon, 
and Idaho, provides a unique environment to assess risk management strategies for non-irrigated 
crop producers.  The behavior of non-irrigated producers is similar across the three states, with 
three distinct rainfall zones following different rotational practices (Hall, Young and Walker).  
The three rainfall zones include:  1) a dry area with less than 15 inches of annual precipitation 
that utilizes a winter wheat/summer fallow rotation; 2) an intermediate zone with 15-18 inches of 
rainfall using a three-year rotation that typically includes two crops and one summer fallow; and 
3) a wet zone with more than 18 inches of annual precipitation that continuously crops using a 
three crop rotation.  A single small grain (wheat) is the primary cash crop, with several other 
traditional and specialty crops (primarily barley, pulses, and minor oilseeds) used in rotation to 
accomplish economic and agronomic goals.  Although changes in production practices 




above are still dominant (Young, Kwon and Young).  Additionally, these traditional practices 
generally characterize non-irrigated crop production in much of the western United States. 
The region has historically been an area with low utilization rates for traditional Multi-
Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI).  That tradition has carried over into the new revenue-based 
products introduced over the last 10 years.  Using wheat as an example, the national crop 
insurance participation rate was 72.6 percent (insured acres to total planted acres) for the 2000 
crop (Vandeveer and Young).  For the three PNW states, the insured rate for the 2000 wheat crop 
was 61.6 percent.  This level is well below wheat producers in states like Kansas (77.6 percent), 
Montana (88.2 percent), and Texas (78.4 percent), which have participation rates well above the 
national average.  The PNW also has higher rates for the basic coverage (APH-CAT).  APH-
CAT in the PNW is 27.0 percent of total insured wheat acres compared to 17 percent at the 
national level, and 13 to 16 percent in the other three selected states.  The primary revenue 
insurance used for wheat (CRC) represents 25 percent of total US insured acres for wheat, 
whereas CRC represents 18.5 percent of the PNW’s insured wheat acres (Table 1). 
One large county in eastern Washington State (Whitman) has elements of all three 
agronomic zones described above.  Thus, there is a unique opportunity to have an intensive 
research focus on risk management choices in a single county that has applicability to a much 
broader geographic region.  The purposes of this study are:  1) to identify and evaluate 
alternative risk management strategies under three rotational systems commonly used for non-
irrigated production in the PNW; 2) to evaluate the role of FSRIA and its impact on the use of 
market pricing instruments and yield insurance products, and 3) to assess how modifying 
selected factors impacting risk management decisions can influence the value of risk 




this research.  These portfolios include futures markets, alternative forms of crop insurance 
(stylized versions of APH, IP, and CRC), and government programs (including direct payments, 
loan deficiency payments, and counter cyclical payments).  All of these are assessed in the 
context of commonly used rotations with one, two, and three crops, which should capture some 
diversification impacts on risk management. 
Evaluating Risk Management Strategies 
Much of the previous research conducted on assessing risk management tools for non-
irrigated crop producers has focused on the corn belt region or the southern and northern plains.  
Several studies have looked specifically at crop insurance as a risk management tool (Ahsan, Ali 
and Kurian; Heifner and Coble; Smith and Baquet; Wang, Hanson and Black; Wang, et al.).  An 
excellent survey of crop insurance literature (covering the period from 1980 to the mid-1990s), 
was conducted by Knight and Coble in 1997.  Other studies have looked at the relationship 
between crop insurance and market-based price risk management tools (Dhuyvetter and Kastens; 
Coble, Heifner and Zuniga), or included other important variables like financial leverage (Gloy 
and Baker).  Risk management assessment research is limited for the western region, especially 
for the PNW, although some work has been done (Jones; Ke and Wang).  Although several 
methods have been used to evaluate alternative risk management strategies in agriculture, the 
expected utility approach and stochastic dominance have been used the most extensively during 
the last several years.  The expected utility approach is used in this study. 
This analysis assumes a representative farmer from each of the three PNW production 
regions discussed above selects a portfolio of risk management instruments at planting time each 
year.  The choice is based on maximizing expected utility of wealth at harvest.  That is: 




where U is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function; w is the per acre stochastic terminal 
wealth; w0 is an initial wealth level determined by average per acre equity ($550 per acre for 
Whitman County); and p is the per acre profit function from all farmland in production and 
fallow.  Profit is specified as revenue generated from cash sales, hedging, yield and revenue 
insurance indemnities, and government payments less production costs, hedging transaction 
costs, and insurance premiums.  That is: 
p = NP + FI + (YI or RI or RIr) + GP            (2) 
where; 
NP = PLY – CY or revenue from selling crops in the cash market less production costs 
(wheat only for the dry region, wheat and barley for the intermediate region, and 
wheat, barley, and peas for the wet region).  PL is the local cash price at harvest 
(Portland price less 50 cents per bushel for wheat; Portland less 43 cents per bushel 
for barley; and the local cash price for peas).  Y is the corresponding realized per 
acre yield, with prices and yields being stochastic.  CY is the cost of producing Y, 
determined by total rotation budgeted production cost ($230 for the two year 
rotation, $465 for the three year rotation with two crops, and $707 for the three year 
rotation with three crops).  Budgeted costs for Whitman County are taken from 
Painter, Hinman, and Burns. 
 
FI = x1E(Y)(F-F0) – CF or net return from hedging.  The value of x1 is the hedging 
quantity chosen at planting time expressed as a ratio of E(Y) or expected yield (x1 is 
negative for a short hedge), F is the stochastic wheat futures price at harvest, and F0 
is the planting time futures price.  For this analysis, F0 = $2.96 per bushel, which is 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) Sep 2002 wheat futures price during September 
of 2001.  F is adjusted to be unbiased, or the E(F) = F0, in order to avoid any 
speculating effect from the decision model.  Transaction costs associated with 
hedging (CF) are set at $0.017 per bushel, based on a $50 commission per contract, 
a margin of $745, and an interest rate of 5 percent. 
 
YI = Pbmax [0,x2E(Y) –Y] – PREy or net indemnity from yield insurance (APH for the 
crops grown in each of the three regions).  Pb is the base price for insurance 
purposes which is equal to the CBT Sep wheat futures price plus a Portland basis of 
$0.45 per bushel for wheat ($3.41); 85 percent of the Sep corn futures price during 
February for barley ($1.90); and the expected local cash price for peas ($7.49 per 
hundredweight or cwt).  The insurance coverage level is denoted by x2, and is 
restricted to be either zero or from [0.50 to 0.85] for wheat and barley, and from 




the realized yield at harvest.  The yield insurance premium is PREy for 1, 2, or 3 
crops depending on the rotation. 
 
RI = max [0,x3PbE(Y) – PPY] – PREr or net indemnity from revenue insurance without 
price replacement (a stylized version of IP).  The coverage level of x3 is chosen 
under the same restrictions as YI.  Pb, E(Y), and Y are also defined the same way as 
in YI.  PP is the Portland harvest price for wheat and barley.  Peas do not have a 
revenue insurance product.  The revenue insurance premium is PREr for wheat and 
barley. 
 
RIr = max [0, x4PbE(Y) – PPY, x4PPE(Y) – PPY] – PRErr or net indemnity from revenue 
insurance with price replacement (a stylized CRC).  Variables are defined as for RI, 
except now the potential indemnity is the higher of two revenues determined by the 
insurance base price (Pb) or Portland harvest price (PP).  PRErr is the insurance 
premium, and x4 is the selected coverage level as restricted for yield insurance (YI). 
 
GP = DP + CC + LDP or the sum of government payments.  Direct Payments (DP) exist 
for wheat ($0.52 per bushel) and for barley ($0.24 per bushel) on 85 percent of the 
base acres times base yield (the base yield for DP is equal to the “old” base, which 
is set at 90 percent of the expected 2002 yield or E(Y).  The Counter Cyclical (CC) 
payment for wheat is equal to max [0; $3.86 – (max(Paw,Pnl) + DP)] times 85 
percent of the base.  The base yield is updated for the CC payment, and equal to 
93.5 percent of the expected yield or E(Y).  Paw is the Portland cash wheat price at 
harvest adjusted for location and time (Portland less 50 cents for wheat, which 
represents the average difference between the Sep Portland price and the US season 
average farm-level price for wheat). Pnl is the national loan rate of $2.80.  The CC 
payment for barley is max [0; $2.21 – (max(Pab, Pnl) + DP) times 85 percent of the 
base, with the variables defined for barley instead of wheat, a price differential of 40 
cents per bushel, and a national loan rate of $1.88.  There are no DP or CC 
payments for peas.  The loan deficiency payment (LDP) exists for all three 
commodities and is equal to max [0, LR- PL]Y, where LR is $2.90 per bushel for 
wheat, $2.14 per bushel for barley, and $6.33 per cwt for peas. PL and Y are defined 
earlier. 
 
Since the PNW region produces soft white wheat (which has no actively traded futures 
contact), the CBT futures market is used for hedging.  Per rotation based profit in the expected 
utility function is adjusted to a consistent one acre return (that is, profits for the dry region are 
divided by two acres and profits for the other two regions are divided by three acres). 
The farmer is assumed to have constant relative risk aversion, with the utility functional 







q )                  (3) 
where q is the relative risk aversion coefficient.  The value of the risk aversion coefficient is set 
at q  = 2, which is based on previous research (Wang, Hanson and Black; Coble, Heifner and 
Zuniga; Pope and Just). 
Model Input Data 
  To accurately assess the risk environment, appropriate yield and price distributions must 
be determined.  Joint distributions of prices and yields are simulated for the 2002 crop year 
relevant to the farms in the three rainfall areas.  Crop yield distributions for soft white winter 
wheat, spring barley, and dry peas are simulated based on a combination of farm-level and 
county-level yield data. 
  Farm-level yields are collected and maintained by RMA to establish a yield base for crop 
insurance purposes.  Yield histories are uniquely identified using a policy number.  Each policy 
number has a state, county, and crop identifier, and the 2002 files also include a legal description 
of the insured unit.  Thus, it is possible to segregate Whitman County farm-level actual yields by 
commodity, and separate geographically within the county using the section, township, and 
range descriptors of the insured units (Risk Management Agency).  This data set keeps a 
maximum of ten years of yield observations (2001 is the most recent year) as required to 
establish a complete yield base, although the ten observed yields may not cover the most recent 
10 years.  Only actual yield observations are used in this analysis, and some farms have less than 
ten actual yields reported.  Those with less than six actual yield observations were deleted from 
the data set.  These actual on-farm yield data represent the first step used to establish yield 
distributions for each commodity (winter wheat, spring barley, and dry peas) within the three 




the dry region (78 observations); 2) wheat in the intermediate region (469 observations); 3) 
barley in the intermediate region (298 observations); 4) wheat in the wet region (543 
observations); 5) barley in the wet region (311 observations); and 6) peas in the wet region (258 
observations). 
A longer period (64 years) of county-level yield data is used to determine trend and 
distributional form.  Farm-level yields are assumed to follow the same trend and distribution as 
county yields, but are adjusted for mean and variance based on the de-trended farm-level yield 
data for each precipitation area.  A linear trend (with an autoregressive term in the case of wheat) 
is estimated for each crop.  Wheat in the PNW often follows summer fallow, which means a high 
yield (good moisture) year in period t likely impacts yield in year t+1. Ground that is fallow 
collects moisture in year t (the “good” year), and the yield in year t+1 is improved.  The opposite 
argument follows for years those with low moisture. 
Distributional form of crop yield data continues to be a debated issue (Just and Weninger; 
Ker and Coble; Ramirez, Misra and Field), although there is some agreement that distributional 
form impacts insurance-based outcomes (Goodwin, Roberts and Coble).  Although the normal 
can be supported, other distributional forms have been suggested (Hennessy, Babcock and 
Hayes; Moss and Shonkwiler; Nelson and Preckel).  Several normality tests (Shapiro-Wilk; 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov; Cramer-von Mises; Anderson-Darlin) conducted on yield residuals after 
adjusting for trend indicate normality cannot be rejected for wheat.  Barley and pea yields also 
passed the normality tests after removal of one severe drought year (1977).  The final estimated 
models used for simulating yields are normal for wheat, with barley and peas simulated using a 
mixture of two normal components.  The second component is another normal with a lower 




mean and variance used for the drought year are the 1977 county mean and county variance for 
all three crops. 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) models have been 
commonly used for commodity cash and futures prices.  For this analysis, wheat cash and futures 
prices are estimated with a bivariate GARCH model.  Barley and dry peas are estimated 
separately using a univariate GARCH model.  Price models are estimated from weekly price data 
covering the four years prior to the expected planting date for the 2001 crop (September 1997 to 
August 2000 for wheat futures and cash prices, and April 1998 to March 2001 for barley and pea 
cash prices).  Since there is no closed form solution for the price distributions, numerical 
methods are used to generate the distributions.  Wheat cash and futures prices for the first week 
of September 2001 ($3.69 and $2.96 per bushel, respectively) are the initial values for simulating 
their joint distribution for the 2002 harvest period.  Barley and pea initial values are cash prices 
for the first week of April 2002 ($2.22 per bushel and $7.39 per cwt, respectively).  Both periods 
represent the planting time for the respective crop. 
 An empirical distribution with 2000 samples is simulated for each crop’s price and yield.  
The independently simulated distributions (joint in the case of wheat cash and wheat futures 
prices) are converted into joint distributions using a linear transformation to impose the 
estimated correlation structure.  Summary statistics for the simulated price and yield data are 
presented in Table 2, along with correlation values for the simulated joint distributions. 
Results 
  The optimization choices suggested by decision model (1) are solved numerically using 
GAUSS.  Equivalent variation (EV) is utilized to evaluate alternative risk management portfolios 




(per acre in this case) that would have to be provided to the farmer to keep him or her as well off 
as providing the farmer with the specified risk management portfolio.  EV can be calculated by 
solving: 
  E[u(wo + p*)] = E[u(w0 + p0 + EV)]              (4) 
where p* is the net return from using a specific risk management portfolio at the optimum level, 
and p0 is the net return from selling in the cash market (NP in equation 2). 
The alternative portfolios include each risk management tool separately, and several 
logical combinations of crop insurance and/or hedging (Tables 3.1 to 3.3).  The alternative risk 
management portfolios are assessed under several different scenarios.  The base scenario is 
designed to represent the current situation.  Premium subsidies represent 2002 levels, and a 
premium loading of 30 percent above the actuarially fair premium is assumed.  All government 
program payments are in place, and hedging with futures involves a transaction cost of $0.017 
per bushel. 
An increased risk aversion scenario looks at the impact of assuming a more risk-averse 
farmer (raising the risk aversion coefficient from 2 to 3).  Three scenarios evaluate the impact of 
altering the structure of crop insurance premiums relative to the base scenario.  The “No 
Premium Subsidy with Loading” scenario eliminates premium subsidies, and leaves the 30 
percent loading.  The “Actuarially Fair Premium with Subsidy” scenario leaves the premium 
subsidy in, and eliminates the 30 percent loading.  Another scenario (No Premium Subsidy and 
Actuarially Fair Premium) has no premium subsidy, but eliminates the 30 percent premium 
loading.  To assess the impact of transaction costs on hedging, one scenario includes the use of 
futures with the $0.017 per bushel cost eliminated.  Another scenario looks at the impact of 





Seven alternative risk management portfolios are analyzed for the dry region, which has 
only one crop (Table 3.1).  For the base scenario, CRC with a coverage level of 0.82 is identified 
as the optimum strategy.  The farmer does not choose the maximum possible coverage of 0.85 
because there is a tradeoff among three factors:  risk protection, subsidy acquisition, and loading 
expense.  Hedging with futures reflects a hedge ratio of zero, so “CRC+Futures” provides the 
same result as CRC alone.  This outcome is different when compared to earlier results in Coble, 
Heifner and Zuniga or Ke andWang when the government program did not include CC 
payments. These differing results suggest CC payments protect farmers from price risk at no 
cost, leaving little room for the futures market.  CRC has a price and yield insurance component 
(relative to APH which has only a yield insurance component), has the price replacement feature 
(relative to IP), and tends to have the largest proportional premium subsidy.  The fact that IP is 
used less and has a lower value than APH is also different relative to previous research (Wang, 
Hanson and Black; Ke and Wang).  The likely explanation is again the inclusion of a CC 
payment program, which protects against price risk at no cost.  IP has no advantage over APH 
considering IP’s extra price risk protection.  Therefore, the farmer weighs the price risk 
protection less compared to the premium loading expense and chooses a lower coverage. 
The EV values ranging from $25.78 to $26.35 are primarily driven by government 
program payments, which totals $24.66.  The values of the alternative crop insurance products 
(measured by subtracting total EV from the EV associated with government payments only) are 
between $1.12 and $1.69.  Although a dollar or two per acre may not seem to be a large amount 




  Increasing the risk aversion coefficient to 3 means the more risk-averse producer has a 
higher EV for all risk management portfolios.  However, the rank order of the selections is 
similar to the base scenario.  CRC remains as the dominant risk management portfolio, and all 
hedge ratios are zero.  The coverage levels stay the same or increase slightly, since a more risk-
averse farmer tends to weigh the risk protection slightly more than the added premium expense. 
Note that for the remaining scenarios that include government payments, the government 
payment only (“Only GP”) alternative will have a constant EV of $24.66.  The scenarios do not 
impact the level or valuation of government payments, so the “only GP” alternative is not 
included for those scenarios where its value does not change.  Also, results for two scenarios are 
not presented in Table 3.1.  When the premium subsidy is eliminated (“No Premium Subsidy 
with Loading” scenario), all insurance coverage levels go to zero, and the hedge ratio remains at 
zero.  Apparently, the 1.3 premium loading factor makes the insurance too expensive.  EV per 
acre of $24.66 (which is the same as the base scenario with only government payments) remains 
constant for all of the risk management portfolio alternatives.  Eliminating futures transaction 
costs produces the same outcome for each portfolio alternative as the base scenario, with all 
hedge ratios being zero.  Evidently transaction costs are not the primary impediment to using 
futures when the new CC payment program fills the need for price insurance at no cost and no 
basis risk. 
A premium with no loading and full subsidy (“Actuarially Fair Premium with Subsidy”) 
means all insurance products are used at the maximum level.  CRC still dominates for the same 
reasons discussed in the base scenario.  This scenario provides the lowest cost insurance, since 
there is no premium loading but a full premium subsidy.  As expected, the lowest cost insurance 




provides outcomes similar to the fair premium with subsidy scenario just discussed, except the 
EV’s are slightly reduced to reflect elimination of the subsidy (that is, a higher insurance cost).  
Coverage is still at the maximum level since a risk-averse decision-maker always wants coverage 
to be as full as possible when the premium is actuarially fair. 
In the scenario with no government programs, futures are utilized although at fairly low 
levels.  Hedging still has a transaction cost which may limit the use of futures.  The subsidized 
revenue insurance products also provide protection against price risk.  The futures position is 
smaller when revenue insurance is in place when compared to just yield insurance.  Using APH 
with futures results in a hedge ratio of –0.12, implying a short futures position on 12 percent of 
expected production.  The optimum portfolio of CRC with futures has a hedge ratio of –0.09.  
The low EV values of the “No Government Programs” scenario clearly demonstrate the role 
government payments play in risk management. 
For the single crop rotation (dry region), there is generally a small difference between 
strategies.  Government payments provide the primary source of EV.  Part of this EV clearly 
comes from price risk protection, but more may come from the significant increase in expected 
income.  The per acre expected income transfer from government payments, or E(GP)/2, is 
$24.28.  Given an EV per acre for “Only GP” of $24.66, this leaves an additional value of $0.38 
for price risk protection.  CRC is typically the preferred insurance product, and no insurance is 
purchased without a subsidized premium under a premium regime that assumes a 1.3 loading as 
part of transaction costs.  Hedging only comes in when government payments are completely 
eliminated, and then at fairly low levels.  Increasing the level of risk aversion, while increasing 






Thirteen portfolios are analyzed for the intermediate region (2 crops) using the same 
seven scenarios (Table 3.2).  Results are similar to the dry region.  For the base scenario, futures 
or combinations using futures result in hedge ratios of zero.  Outcomes for all the combinations 
that include futures are exactly the same as the corresponding crop insurance combinations 
without futures.  Therefore, the portfolios using a combination of crop insurance and hedging 
with futures are not presented.  CRC for wheat combined with APH for barley represents the 
optimum risk management portfolio for the base scenario.  CRC on wheat is at the 83 percent 
coverage level, and APH insurance on barley is at the 80 percent level.  Results from the dry 
region suggest CRC is ranked first, followed by APH and IP.  Since there is no CRC for barley, 
APH is selected.  The relatively lower coverage for barley compared with wheat is caused by the 
lower amount of risk protection associated with the barley policy.  When a yield loss occurs, the 
indemnity payment for wheat is calculated on a base price of $3.41, which is fairly close (92 
percent) to the mean cash price of $3.69.  This represents more protection when compared to 
barley, where the base price is only $1.90 and the expected cash price is $2.22 (about 85 
percent). 
The government payment EV increases to $32.56 per acre for the intermediate region, of 
which $32.15 is from the expected value of the income transfer related to government payments.  
Only 50 percent of the acres receive government payments in the dry area due to fallow, and the 
more intensive cropping patterns of the intermediate region increase the eligible acreage to 67 
percent.  The per-acre value of the insurance products is reduced in the optimum portfolio for the 
two-crop region.  This reduction is primarily from the lower level of protection associated with 




relative to the subsidy for wheat CRC insurance.  The total value is an average per acre for both 
wheat and barley in the intermediate region. 
Increasing the risk aversion coefficient (more risk averse) doesn’t change the relative 
ranking of portfolio values.  CRC for wheat and APH for barley remain in the optimum portfolio, 
with insured levels essentially unchanged.  Altering the premium structure for crop insurance 
products by eliminating the 30 percent premium loading (Actuarially Fair Premium with 
Subsidy), or eliminating the premium subsidy produces results similar to the single crop rotation.  
Lowering the cost of insurance means insurance is used at higher levels, and EV values also 
increase.  The EV value is still lower for the optimum portfolio compared to the dry region even 
though the barley coverage is also 0.85 and a lower subsidy is provided, again suggesting barley 
insurance has a weaker risk protection effect than wheat.  The combination of CRC for wheat 
and APH for barley is still the optimum portfolio, with a higher EV value associated with the 
largest reduction in premiums (eliminating the 30 percent load, but maintaining the premium 
subsidy). 
When government programs are eliminated, hedging begins to play a role in portfolio 
selection.  The futures-based portfolio (hedging wheat) has a hedge ratio of –0.16, implying 
about 16 percent of the expected yield is hedged with a short futures position.  The optimum risk 
management portfolio becomes the combination of CRC for wheat, APH for barley, and hedging 
14 percent of expected wheat yield.  As was true for the dry region, eliminating government 
programs has a substantial impact on the EV values.  Again, results clearly indicate government 
programs are the dominant price risk management tool for non-irrigated grain producers.  




region suggests farmers can cross hedge barley on wheat futures.  Barley and wheat cash prices 
are positively correlated. 
Results for two scenarios are not presented in Table 3.2.  When the premium subsidy is 
eliminated (“No Premium Subsidy” scenario), coverage levels for all insurance products become 
zero.  Thus, results are the same as for the base scenario with government programs only (“GP 
only” which has an EV of $32.56).  Eliminating futures transaction costs from the base scenario 
has no impact on the use of hedging.  Hedge ratios are zero for all portfolios that include wheat 
futures. 
Generally, results for the intermediate region with a two-crop/fallow rotation are similar 
to the single crop region.  There seems to be little evidence of any diversification impact on risk 
associated with adding the additional crop.  APH for barley is preferred over the available 
revenue product (IP).  Barley can be cross-hedged on wheat futures when the government 
program is not in place.  The base price used in the insurance indemnity is important in the risk 
protection value of an insurance product.  Barley insurance is less valuable than wheat insurance 
even in the actuarially fair case. 
Wet Region: 
For the wet region, a three-crop rotation means each portfolio must include some 
combination of the three crops.  Seven scenarios are analyzed, with six presented in Table 3.3.  
Similar to the intermediate area, the optimum portfolio for the base scenario includes CRC for 
wheat and APH for the other crops (barley and peas).  APH is preferred over IP for barley, likely 
for the same reasons discussed regarding the intermediate region.  With CC payments, the price 
risk protection of IP seems to have limited value.  Futures markets are also not utilized in the 




presented except when government programs are eliminated.  In this base scenario, peas are 
consistently insured at the maximum allowable level (0.75), suggesting producers prefer the 
higher coverage levels. 
The government program EV increases by almost $4 for the intermediate region to 
$36.34, and the expected income transfer reaches $35.73.  This increase is primarily a result of 
replacing the fallow acres with pea acres that are eligible for the loan deficiency payment.  The 
EV’s of the alternative insurance products are also higher compared to both the dry and 
intermediate areas, which suggests inclusion of the pea APH improves the insurance portfolio 
value.  That is, the pea APH has a higher value than wheat and barley insurance products.  
Notice the maximum coverage level for the pea APH is only 0.75, lower than both wheat and 
barley.  However, the base price is set at the expected cash price, which is relatively higher than 
the other two crops.  A higher base price and a higher coverage level can both increase the 
indemnity payment. However, the latter results in a lower premium subsidy rate based on the 
current regressive subsidy schedule.  It seems the higher base price gives growers more benefit 
than the loss from a reduced coverage level in this case. 
The impact of increasing the risk aversion coefficient to 3 again increases the EV values, 
but does not change the ranking of the portfolios.  The portfolio of CRC for wheat with APH for 
barley and peas (all at or near maximum levels) is still the optimum selection.  EV values are 
slightly above the base scenario to reflect the greater value of additional protection.  The two 
scenarios that reduce the cost of insurance (eliminating the premium loading with or without the 
subsidy) means insurance products are consistently used at the maximum level.  EV’s are highest 
for the scenario with the lowest insurance cost (actuarially fair with a premium subsidy).  The 




When the government program is eliminated, some hedging takes place for wheat. The 
levels are comparable with what occurred for the intermediate region.  This means the farmer 
doesn’t cross hedge peas on wheat futures, since pea and wheat prices are essentially 
uncorrelated.  The optimum strategy is CRC for wheat, APH for wheat and barley, and hedging 
16 percent of the wheat crop.   
The scenario with premium loading but no premium subsidy includes using a low 
(essentially, the minimum) level of wheat insurance.  Compared to the other regions where yield 
and revenue are generally more risky, it seems counter intuitive farmers in the wet region would 
buy the actuarially unfair insurance while farmers in dry and intermediate areas don’t.  However, 
the level of insurance is jointly determined by both risk protection and premium cost.  Although 
risk protection values are higher for the two regions with higher risks, the 30 percent loading is 
more punitive relative to the wet region.  The base (that is, the expected indemnity) is higher for 
the regions with more risk.  A different level of premium loading or a different level of risk 
aversion may alter the relative insurance usages among the three areas.  
Summary and Conclusions 
  A model based on utility maximization is used to model risk management behavior for 
non-irrigated crop producers in the PNW region.  Three rotational practices commonly used in 
the PNW are included (winter wheat/summer fallow; winter wheat/spring barley/summer fallow; 
and winter wheat/spring barley/dry peas).  Representative farms for Whitman County, 
Washington are used to model risk management behavior.  Risk management portfolios that 
include hedging with wheat futures, yield insurance, revenue insurance (a stylized IP and CRC), 
government programs, and several logical combinations are analyzed.  Equivalent variation is 




  Results generally suggest that government programs account for the primary value 
associated with risk management portfolios available to non-irrigated PNW crop producers.  This 
likely reflects both the price risk protection associated with counter cyclical (CC) payments, and 
the general increase in assured revenue.  Contrary to previous studies when the CC program was 
not in place, hedging or combining hedging with insurance products play a limited role for 
increasing risk management value.  The optimum portfolio consistently includes revenue 
insurance (CRC is preferred over IP) combined with APH for those crops not having a CRC 
product offered.  Barley has both an APH and an IP product, but APH is consistently associated 
with a higher EV.  Portfolios using hedging with futures are dominant only when government 
payments are eliminated. 
  A few points need to be highlighted focusing specifically on the papers three objectives.  
First, the optimum portfolio is consistently CRC for wheat (the only crop with a CRC program), 
plus APH for the other available crops.  APH is preferred to IP even when government programs 
are eliminated as a source of price risk protection.  With regard to rotations, there appears to be 
no diversification impacts for the multiple crop rotations commonly used in the PNW region.  
Second, government programs have a high income transfer value and clearly dominate total risk 
protection.  When compared to previous studies that don’t include the CC payment regime, these 
payments seem to substantially reduce the use of hedging with futures.  In this analysis, the 
absence of government programs is needed for hedging to play a role in risk management.  When 
scenario changes impacting the cost of insurance products are analyzed, some sensitivity to 
premium subsidies and premium loading are apparent.  When the premium subsidy is eliminated, 
a loading factor or 1.3 is prohibitive since all insurance products are either not used, or used at 




premium loading, or the loading factor is reduced to 1.0 (actuarially fair premium) with the 
existing subsidy structure, insurance products are used but at lower levels. 
Additionally, the base price setting procedure can have a significant impact on crop 
insurance products.  Wheat and pea products have a base price close to their expected price in the 
PNW.  Both products tend to be used at higher levels, and provide greater risk protection value 
when compared with barley.  The base price for barley insurance is lower relative to the expected 
cash price when compared to wheat and peas.  Results generally seem robust relative to the risk 
preference of decision-makers.  Increasing the risk aversion coefficient from 2 to 3 impacts the 





Table 1.  Crop Insurance Participation Rates for Wheat in the Pacific Northwest (PNW), Selected 
               States, and the United States for the 2000 Crop. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                            Crop Insurance     Revenue Insurance (CRC)     APH-CAT 
State or                  Participation            Share of Insured           Share of Insured 
Region                        Rate                         Acres (%)                     Acres (%) 
 
PNW      61.6      18.4      27.0 
 
Kansas     77.6      24.2      15.6 
 
Montana    88.2        7.0      13.1 
 
Texas      78.4      18.8      15.2 
 
US      72.6      25.0      17.0 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Participation rate is insured wheat acres for all insurance plans divided by planted wheat 
           acres.  Rates for CRC and APH CAT are acres insured under the respective program 
           divided by insured acres (that is, the plan’s share of total acres insured). 
 
Sources:  Vandeveer and Young; Risk Management Agency, Summary of Business 





Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Price and Yield Simulated Data for the Dry, Intermediate, and 
               Wet Zones in Whitman County, Washington. 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
                         Correlation Coefficients 
Region    Standard      Wheat Wheat Wheat Barley Barley   Pea  Pea 




Wheat FP    2.96     0.75    0.70     1.00   0.48  -0.03     na     na    na  na 
Wheat CP    3.69     0.61    0.52     0.48   1.00  -0.03     na     na    na  na 




Wheat FP    2.96     0.75     0.70     1.00   0.48  -0.02   0.31  -0.01    na  na 
Wheat CP    3.69     0.61     0.52     0.48   1.00  -0.04   0.63  -0.01    na  na 
Wheat Yld  75.42   14.31     0.00    -0.02  -0.04   1.00  -0.04   0.27    na  na 
Barley CP    2.22     0.21     0.23     0.31   0.63  -0.04   1.00  -0.02    na  na 




Wheat FP    2.96     0.75     0.70     1.00   0.48   0.00   0.31   0.02   0.02  -0.02 
Wheat CP    3.69     0.61     0.52     0.48   1.00  -0.03   0.63   0.00  -0.02  -0.02 
Wheat Yld  89.16   14.97    -0.04     0.00  -0.03   1.00  -0.02   0.11  -0.01   0.38 
Barley CP    2.22     0.21     0.23     0.31   0.63  -0.02   1.00   0.03   0.04   0.02 
Barley Yld  73.17   18.69    -0.43     0.02   0.00   0.11   0.03   1.00   0.01   0.21 
Pea CP     7.39     0.63     0.16     0.02   0.02  -0.01   0.04   0.01   1.00  -0.04 
Pea Yld  19.85     5.64    -0.20    -0.02  -0.02   0.38   0.03   0.21  -0.04   1.00 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  Wheat FP is wheat futures price in dollars per bushel. 
  Wheat CP is wheat cash price in dollars per bushel. 
  Wheat Yld is wheat yield in bushels per acre. 
  Barley CP is barley cash price in dollars per bushel. 
  Barley Yld is barley yield in bushels per acre. 
  Pea CP is pea cash price in dollars per hundredweght (cwt). 
  Pea Yld is pea yield in cwt per acre. 
  na = not appliable. 
 




Table 3.1.  Optimization Results for the Winter Wheat/Summer Fallow Rotation – Dry Area. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                              Base Scenario                                                 Increase Risk Aversion Coefficient to 3 
 
Risk Mngt.          Hedge   Insurance         EV     EV less GP                       Hedge    Insurance         EV     EV less GP 
Alternative           Ratio     Coverage    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre)                           Ratio      Coverage    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre) 
Only GP   na   na  24.66    0   na   na  24.83    0 
Futures    0   na  24.66    0    0   na  24.83    0 
APH   na  0.83  25.92  1.26   na  0.83  26.30  1.47 
IP   na  0.82  25.78  1.12   na  0.83  26.13  1.30 
CRC   na  0.82  26.35  1.69   na  0.83  26.77  1.94 
APH+Futures    0  0.83  25.91  1.26    0  0.83  26.30  1.47 
IP+Futures    0  0.82  25.78  1.12    0  0.83  26.13  1.30 
CRC+Futures    0  0.82  26.35  1.69    0  0.83  26.77  1.94 
 
                                                                                                                                 No Premium Subsidy and 
                            Actuarially Fair Premium with Subsidy                                       Actuarially Fair Premium  
 
Risk Mngt.          Hedge   Insurance         EV     EV less GP                        Hedge    Insurance        EV     EV less GP 
Alternative           Ratio     Coverage    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre)                           Ratio      Coverage    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre) 
Futures    0   na  24.66    0    0  na  24.66    0 
APH   na  0.85  26.59  1.94   na  0.85  25.11  0.46 
IP   na  0.85  26.39  1.74   na  0.85  25.04  0.38 
CRC   na  0.85  27.28  2.63   na  0.85  25.18  0.53 
APH+Futures    0  0.85  26.59  1.94    0  0.85  25.11  0.45 
IP+Futures    0  0.85  26.39  1.74    0  0.85  25.04  0.38 
CRC+Futures    0  0.85  27.28  2.63    0  0.85  25.18  0.53 
 
                                     No Government Program 
 
Risk Mngt.          Hedge   Insurance         EV     EV less GP   
Alternative           Ratio     Coverage    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre)  
Futures  -0.11   na    0.02  0.02 
APH   na  0.83    1.24  1.24 
IP   na  0.83    1.24  1.24 
CRC   na  0.82    1.75  1.75 
APH+Futures  -0.12  0.83    1.25  1.25 
IP+Futures  -0.06  0.83    1.24  1.24 
CRC+Futures  -0.09  0.82    1.76  1.76 
Note:  The first five portfolios represent each risk management tool separately.  Government payments only, futures only, 
and each insurance product are presented separately.  The next three portfolios are insurance products combined with 
hedging using futures.  The “Only GP” portfolio is not repeated for all scenarios since its value is not impacted by the 
scenario changes.  The column labeled “EV less GP” reflects the value of the portfolio after the EV from government 




Table 3.2.  Optimization Results for the Winter Wheat/Spring Barley/Summer Fallow Rotation – Intermediate Area. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                  Base Scenario                                           Increase Risk Aversion Coefficient to 3 
 
Risk Mngt.                          Hedge  Ins. Coverage        EV     EV less GP             Hedge   Ins. Coverage      EV     EV less GP 
Alternative                           Ratio  Wheat  Barley    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre)                 Ratio  Wheat  Barley   ($/Acre)    ($/Acre) 
Only GP  na   na   na  32.56     0  na   na   na  32.75     0 
Futures_W   0   na   na  32.56     0   0   na   na  32.75     0 
APH_W&B  na  0.84  0.80  33.89  1.33  na  0.84  0.80  34.27  1.52 
IP_W&B  na  0.83  0.79  33.69  1.13  na  0.84  0.79  34.03  1.28 
CRC_W+APH_B  na  0.83  0.79  34.17  1.61  na  0.84  0.80  34.56  1.81 
CRC_W+IP_B  na  0.83  0.79  33.99  1.43  na  0.84  0.79  34.37  1.61 
APH_W+IP_B  na  0.84  0.79  33.71  1.15  na  0.85  0.79  34.17  1.32 
IP_W+APH_B  na  0.83  0.80  33.87  1.31  na  0.84  0.80  34.24  1.48 
 
                                                                                                                                            No Premium Subsidy and 
                                               Actuarially Fair Premium with Subsidy                               Actuarialy Fair Premium  
 
Risk Mngt.                          Hedge  Ins. Coverage        EV     EV less GP             Hedge   Ins. Coverage      EV     EV less GP 
Alternative                           Ratio  Wheat  Barley    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre)                 Ratio  Wheat  Barley   ($/Acre)    ($/Acre) 
Futures_W   0   na   na  32.56     0   0   na   na  32.56     0 
APH_W&B  na  0.85  0.85  34.58  2.02  na  0.85  0.85  32.97  0.40 
IP_W&B  na  0.85  0.84  34.27  1.71  na  0.85  0.85  32.93  0.37 
CRC_W+APH_B  na  0.85  0.85  35.05  2.49  na  0.85  0.85  33.01  0.45 
CRC_W+IP_B  na  0.85  0.84  34.76  2.20  na  0.85  0.85  33.00  0.44 
APH_W+IP_B  na  0.85  0.84  34.29  1.73  na  0.85  0.85  32.97  0.40 
IP_W+APH_B  na  0.85  0.85  34.56  2.00  na  0.85  0.85  32.94  0.38 
 
                                                         No Government Programs 
 
Risk Mngt.                          Hedge  Ins. Coverage        EV     EV less GP 
Alternative                           Ratio  Wheat  Barley    ($/Acre)   ($/Acre) 
Futures_W  -0.16  na   na  0.02  0.02 
APH_W&B  na  0.84  0.79  1.28  1.28 
IP_W&B  na  0.84  0.79  1.22  1.22 
CRC_W+APH_B  na  0.83  0.79  1.63  1.63 
CRC_W+IP_B  na  0.83  0.79  1.48  1.48 
APH_W+IP_B  na  0.84  0.79  1.13  1.13 
IP_W+APH_B  na  0.84  0.79  1.38  1.38 
APH_W&B+Futures          -0.17  0.84  0.79  1.30  1.30 
IP_W&B+Futures               -0.10  0.84  0.79  1.23  1.23 
CRC_W+APH_B+Fut.     -0.14  0.83  0.79  1.64  1.64 
CRC_W+IP_B+Futures      -0.13  0.83  0.79  1.49  1.49 
APH_W+IP_B+Futures      -0.16   0.84  0.79  1.15  1.15 
IP_W+APH_B+Futures      -0.11   0.84  0.79  1.38  1.38 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  The first two portfolios represent government payments only (wheat and barley) and futures only for wheat.  The nex t 
six represent combinations of crop insurance products for wheat (APH, CRC, and IP) and barley (AP and IP).  The 
next six are combinations of crop insurance products and futures.  These last six are only included under the “No 
Government Programs” scenario because the hedge ratios were consistently zero for all the other scenarios.  The 
“Only GP” portfolio is not repeated for all scenarios since its value is not impacted by the scenario changes.  The 





Table 3.3.  Optimization Results for the Winter Wheat/Spring Barley/Peas Rotation – Wet Area. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                  Base Scenario                                           Increase Risk Aversion Coefficient to 3 
 
Risk Mngt.                             Hedge      Ins. Coverage         EV   EV less GP     Hedge    Ins. Coverage          EV    EV less GP 
Alternative                             Ratio   Wheat Barley Peas  ($/Acre)  ($/Acre)       Ratio  Wheat Barley Peas  ($/Acre)  ($/Acre) 
 
Only GP   na   na   na   na  36.34    0   na   na   na   na  36.62     0 
Futures_W    0   na   na  na  36.34    0   na   na   na   na  36.62     0 
APH_W&B&P   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  38.49  2.15   na  0.85  0.81  0.75  39.14  2.52 
IP_W&B+APH_P   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  38.36  2.02   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  38.97  2.35 
CRC_W+APH_B&P   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  38.78  2.44   na  0.84  0.81  0.75  39.45  2.83 
CRC_W+IP_B+APH_P   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  38.60  2.26   na  0.84  0.81  0.75  39.25  2.63 
APH_W&P+IP_B   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  38.32  1.98   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  38.95  2.33 
IP_WAPH_B&P   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  38.53  2.19   na  0.84  0.81  0.75  39.17  2.55 
 
                                                                                                                                            No Premium Subsidy and 
                                                   Actuarially Fair Premium with Subsidy                          Actuarially Fair Premium  
 
Risk Mngt.                             Hedge      Ins. Coverage         EV   EV less GP     Hedge    Ins. Coverage          EV    EV less GP 
Alternative                             Ratio   Wheat Barley Peas  ($/Acre)  ($/Acre)       Ratio  Wheat Barley Peas  ($/Acre)  ($/Acre) 
 
Futures_W    0   na   na  na  36.34    0   na   na   na   na  36.34    0 
APH_W&B&P   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  39.34  3.00   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  37.04  0.70 
IP_W&B+APH_P   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  39.15  2.81   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  37.02  0.68 
CRC_W+APH_B&P   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  39.83  3.49   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  37.10  0.76 
CRC_W+IP_B+APH_P   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  39.55  3.21   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  37.10  0.76 
APH_W&P+IP_B   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  39.07  2.73   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  37.05  0.71 
IP_WAPH_B&P   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  39.43  3.09   na  0.85  0.85  0.75  37.02  0.68 
 
                                                                                                                                            No Premium Subsidy and 
                                                              No Government Program                                       Premium Loading of 1.3 
 
Risk Mngt.                             Hedge      Ins. Coverage         EV   EV less GP     Hedge    Ins. Coverage          EV    EV less GP 
Alternative                             Ratio   Wheat Barley Peas  ($/Acre)  ($/Acre)       Ratio  Wheat Barley Peas  ($/Acre)  ($/Acre) 
 
Futures_W  -0.19   na   na  na  0.04  0.04    0   na   na   na  36.34    0 
APH_W&B&P   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.15  2.15   na  0.51  0.00  0.00  36.35  0.01 
IP_W&B+APH_P   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.20  2.20   na  0.50  0.00  0.00  36.34  0.00 
CRC_W+APH_B&P   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  2.54  2.54   na  0.50  0.00  0.00  36.34  0.00 
CRC_W+IP_B+APH_P   na  0.84  0.80  0.75  2.40  2.40   na  0.50  0.00  0.00  36.34  0.00 
APH_W&P+IP_B   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.02  2.02   na  0.51  0.00  0.00  36.35  0.01 
IP_W&APH_B&P   na  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.34  2.34   na  0.50  0.00  0.00  36.34  0.00 
APH_W&B&P+Fut.  -0.20  0.85  0.79  0.75  2.19  2.19 
P_W&B+APH_P+Fut.  -0.14  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.22  2.22 
CRC_W+APH_B&P+Fut.  -0.17  0.84  0.80  0.75  2.57  2.57 
CRC_W+IP_B+APH_P 
       +Futures  -0.16  0.84  0.80  0.75  2.43  2.43 
APH_W&P+IP_B+Fut.  -0.19  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.05  2.05 
IP_WAPH_B&P+Fut  -0.15  0.85  0.80  0.75  2.36  2.36 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note:  The pattern of presentation is similar to Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  The scenario for no premium subsidy is presented in this 
table because a small amount of wheat APH is used without the subsidy.  The portfolios representing combinations of 
futures and crop insurance are not included in the fist four scenarios as is true for the no premium subsidy scenario 
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